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Abstract
Parents spend considerable time and resources investing in their children's develop-
ment. Given evidence that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) aects maternal
labor supply, we investigate how the EITC aects a broad array of time-use activi-
ties, focusing on the amount and nature of time spent with children. Using 2003-2018
time-use data, we nd that federal and state EITC expansions increase maternal work
time, which reduces time devoted to home production, leisure, and time with children.
However, for children of all ages, almost none of the reduction comes from time devoted
to investment activities, such as active learning and development activities.
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1. Introduction
A growing literature documents the importance of family investments for child develop-
ment (e.g., see surveys by Cunha et al., 2006; Heckman and Mosso, 2014; Kalil, 2015), with
parental time becoming an increasingly important form of investment (e.g., Lee and Bowen,
2006; Del Boca et al., 2014; Carneiro et al., 2015; Caucutt et al., 2020). Caucutt et al. (2020)
document that more than two-thirds of all family expenditures on child development (for
children ages 12 or less) come in the form of parental time investments.
It is tempting to assume that the more time mothers spend working, the less they must
spend with their children. Yet, such an assumption is clearly at odds with the time series for
female labor supply and time with children, which have both increased substantially in recent
decades.1 Cross-sectional relationships are also at odds with a direct tradeo. For example,
Guryan et al. (2008) show that more educated parents both work more and spend more
time with their children compared to less-educated parents. Clearly, parents devote time
to many leisure and home production activities besides child care (Becker, 1965; Kooreman
and Kapteyn, 1987; Aguiar and Hurst, 2007), and these activities trade o with work.
Understanding parental (especially maternal) time allocation decisions is critical for un-
derstanding the impacts of tax and transfer policies, including many welfare-to-work initia-
tives, on investments in children and child development. The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), the focus of our study, is one of the most signicant tax/transfer policies in the
United States, impacting millions of low- to middle-income families. Dahl and Lochner
(2012, 2017), Chetty et al. (2011), Bastian and Michelmore (2018), Manoli and Turner
(2018) and Agostinelli and Sorrenti (2018) estimate positive impacts of expansions in the
EITC on test scores, educational attainment, employment, and earnings of economically dis-
advantaged children.2 These studies emphasize the increase in nancial resources for families
that benet from EITC expansions, with much of the increase in family income coming from
1See, e.g., Bryant and Zick (1996), Gauthier et al. (2004), Sayer et al. (2004), Bianchi and Robinson
(1997), Craig (2006), Kimmel and Connelly (2007), Guryan et al. (2008), and Kalil et al. (2012) for evidence
on growing parental time with children, while Costa (2000), Goldin (2006), Fernández (2013), and Bastian
(2020) document the substantial increase in female labor supply over time.
2Hoynes et al. (2015), Averett and Wang (2018), and Braga et al. (2019) show that the EITC also improves
children's health.
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greater labor force participation and higher pre-tax family earnings.3 However, Agostinelli
and Sorrenti (2018) and Bastian and Michelmore (2018) also examine concerns that the addi-
tional time mothers spend working could oset the benets associated with greater nancial
resources. Indeed, several studies estimate negative eects of full-time maternal employment
on child development (Brooks-Gunn et al., 2002; Ruhm, 2004; Bernal, 2008).4
Even if the EITC increases maternal labor supply by increasing net-of-tax wages for
low-income families, it need not reduce parental time investments in children. The positive
income eects from higher wages can create incentives to increase overall investments in
children. As shown by Caucutt et al. (2020), if all investment inputs are suciently comple-
mentary, families may wish to increase all types of investments, including time investments,
despite the increase in their opportunity costs. Thus, higher wages may cause parents to
substitute leisure and home production for time at work with little, or even positive, eects
on time spent with children. Indeed, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) and Kimmel and Con-
nelly (2007) estimate that increases in maternal wages lead to reductions in time devoted to
leisure and home production but much weaker or even modest positive eects on child care.
Looking more directly at impacts of the EITC, studies spanning three decades of re-
search have consistently concluded that it raises employment among single mothers (Homan
and Seidman, 1990; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2003;
Hoynes and Patel, 2018; Bastian, 2020).5 Much less is known about changes in other uses
of time. Looking at a broader set of tax policies, Gelber and Mitchell (2012) estimate that
policies which encourage maternal labor supply also reduce time spent on home production.
In their analysis of the EITC using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Bas-
tian and Michelmore (2018) estimate modest and statistically insignicant eects of EITC
expansions on the time parents spend with their children; however, their sample size is small
and estimates imprecise.
In this paper, we use the 2003-2018 American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) to study, in
3For these mothers, the EITC also improves health (Evans and Garthwaite, 2014), reduces stress and
nancial insecurity (Mendenhall et al., 2012; Jones and Michelmore, 2016), and reduces poverty (Hoynes and
Patel, 2018).
4Using family and child xed eects approaches, Heiland et al. (2017) estimate that mothers who work
10 hours more per week spend about 3-4% less time with their children.
5Recently, Kleven (2019) has challenged this conclusion.
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detail, the time allocation responses of mothers to state and federal expansions in the EITC
with an emphasis on time spent with children. More specically, our main (dierences-in-
dierences style) approach estimates the eects of changes in the maximum EITC benet
level on time spent in dierent activities, accounting for basic family demographic char-
acteristics, state and time xed eects (both interacted with marital status and mother's
educational attainment), and time-varying state-specic measures of economic conditions
and welfare/tax policies. Because ATUS contains detailed information on respondent activ-
ities and who they were with during each activity, we are able to estimate the same basic
specications for a variety of time allocation activities, with and without children.
We begin by estimating impacts of the EITC on mother's labor supply over the 2003
2018 period, noting that most previous research examines earlier expansions (especially the
major expansion from 1993 to 1996). There is some disagreement on the impacts of EITC
expansions after the mid-1990s, with Bastian and Michelmore (2018) and Bastian and Jones
(2019) estimating moderate positive eects (consistent with the previous literature) and
Kleven (2019) nding more modest eects of the 2009 federal expansion and no eects of
state expansions. Our approach is more similar to that taken by Bastian and Michelmore
(2018) and Bastian and Jones (2019),6 reaching similar conclusions: expansions of the EITC
since 2003 have led to increased labor force participation, time spent working, and earnings
among unmarried mothers. We also nd suggestive evidence that federal EITC expansions
had larger eects on labor supplyand on other categories of time usethan state EITC
expansions. This result could reect dierences in public awareness of smaller state vs. larger
federal expansions, a general issue highlighted in Chetty et al. (2013).
Next, we show that the increased time working comes at the expense of both leisure
and home production activities. Decomposing single mothers' time-use into time with and
without children, we estimate reductions in home production and leisure time with children,
but no decrease in these activities without children.
Finally, we closely examine how time with children changes, exploring impacts on in-
vestment (e.g. reading, playing, helping with homework, providing medical care) vs. non-
6Kleven (2019) takes an event-study approach that does not leverage dierences in the magnitude of
dierent expansions for identication.
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investment activities. Our estimates suggest no eect of the EITC on total investment time
for families with children of all ages. Reductions in time with children are almost exclusively
observed for passive non-investment activities like mother's own personal care, housework,
and errands. One interesting exception is that both married and unmarried mothers respond
to EITC expansions by spending less time providing or obtaining medical care for their chil-
dren, which may be due to general improvements in children's health as estimated by Hoynes
et al. (2015), Averett and Wang (2018), and Braga et al. (2019). We also observe modest
increases in the time both single and married mothers play with their children, consistent
with increases in family income if play time is a luxury for parents.
2. Federal and State EITC Policy Details
The EITC distributes over $65 billion a year to almost 30 million low-income families,
lifting 6 million people out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2019). Total
EITC benets are determined by annual earnings, number of children, state of residence,
and marital status. Figure 1 shows the relationship between EITC benets and household
earnings by the number of children and marital status for 2018. As is clear from the gure,
the EITC contains a phase-in region, where benets increase with earnings; a plateau region,
where benets do not change with earnings; and a phase-out region, where benets decrease
with earnings. Households that earn beyond this phase-out region are not eligible for the
EITC. In 2018, federal EITC benets were worth over $6,000 for households with 3 or
more children earning between about $14,000 and $24,000. Maximum possible benets
available to households with 0, 1, and 2 children were approximately $500, $3,500, and
$5,500, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of maximum benets by number of children over time.
The largest EITC expansion occurred between 1993 and 1996, which increased benets
dramatically for those with at least 2 children. Our analysis covers the years 2003-2018.
The only change in the federal EITC schedule during this period occurred in 2009, when the
maximum credit available to families with three or more children increased by about $1,000.
As of 2018, 29 states had their own EITC as well. State EITC benets generally top-up
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federal EITC benets by a xed percent, varying from about 3 to 40 percent (for values up
to $220 to $2,800). Combined, the federal and state EITC can amount to over $9,000 per
year, with the average recipient receiving over $2,500 a year. Figure 3 shows a map of state
EITC rates (as a fraction of federal benets) in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2017. Figure A.1
shows the maximum possible federal plus state EITC benets over time: there is substantial
variation in EITC policy across states within each year.
We combine state and federal annual maximum EITC benet amounts (based on state of
residence, marital status, number and ages of children by year) into the variable,MaxEITC,
which we measure in thousands of real 2018 dollars.7 Panel A in Figure 4 shows the dis-
tribution of MaxEITC for women with 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more children based on our main
sample of women ages 18-49 in the 20032018 ATUS. Panel B in Figure 4 shows the dis-
tribution of MaxEITC before and after the 2009 federal EITC expansion. Together, these
gures illustrate the type of EITC variation over time and across states that we exploit for
identication.
EITC-eligible children must be age 18 or younger, age 1923 and a full-time student, or
any age and disabled. However, incorporating these older children could introduce endo-
geneity and we avoid this concern by dening EITC-eligible dependents as age 18 or less.
3. Empirical Strategy
Although the largest EITC expansion occurred in the 1990s, our time-use data only goes
back to 2003. Fortunately, during our sample period, there is substantial identifying variation
across states and years generated by state EITC policy changes and the 2009 federal EITC
expansion, as well as variation within states and years generated by the large dierence in
EITC benets by number of children (see Figures 3 and 4). EITC policy variation allows us
to compare outcomes for women within states and across years, as well as across states and
within years.
An identifying assumption is that EITC policy expansions are not correlated with other
economic policies or conditions which may themselves aect female employment or time use.
7We use the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers to adjust for ination.
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For example, if states were more likely to create or expand an EITC during economic expan-
sions and budget surpluses, the relationship between state EITCs, female employment, and
time use would reect economic conditions in general, not just EITC-led increases in employ-
ment. We show below that the EITC expansions during our time period are uncorrelated
with state-year measures of economic conditions and policies.
The combined eects of 20032018 state EITC expansions and the 2009 federal EITC
expansions are embodied in MaxEITC, a continuous treatment variable equal to the maxi-
mum possible EITC benets that a family could receive given their state of residence, marital
status, number (and ages) of children, and the year.8 As discussed further below,MaxEITC
reects exogenous policy variation that is independent of family income or actual receipt of
the EITC, which are both endogenous with respect to work behavior.
We use the following dierences-in-dierences style regression to estimate the eects
of EITC expansions on various time-allocation outcomes, Yist, separately for married and
unmarried mothers:
Yist = α1MaxEITCist ·Marist + α2MaxEITCist · Unmarist +X ′istα3 + γs + γt + εist, (1)
where subscript i refers to mother, s to state of residence, and t to year. Marist is an
indicator equal to one for married mothers, while Unmarist = 1 −Marist is an indicator
equal to one for unmarried mothers. The vector Xist contains a rich set of potentially time-
varying individual-level controls, including indicators for the number of children, and annual
state-level factors reecting the underlying economic and policy environment. We show that
results are robust to various subsets of these controls as well as including state-specic time
trends, state-specic time trends by marital status, and interacting annual state factors with
marital status and children. State and year xed eects (FE) are denoted by γs and γt,
respectively. The idiosyncratic error, εist, is assumed to be independent of MaxEITC and
marital status, conditional on other covariates Xist, as well as state and year FE. We report
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.9 ATUS
8MaxEITC is highly correlated with other aspects of the EITC and does a good job of capturing EITC
expansions over time. For example, regressingMaxEITC on the EITC phase-in ratecontrolling for number
of children, state, and year xed eectsyields an R2 of 0.999. We consider the phase-in rate in section 5.9.
9Alternate clustering and standard error specications yield similar results, as does restricting the sample
to unmarried mothers (available upon request).
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weights are used in all specications.
We also explore whether the eects vary by other family characteristics conditional on
marital status, estimating equations of the form:
Yist =MaxEITCist·Marist·Z ′istβ1+MaxEITCist·Unmarist·Z ′istβ2+X ′istβ3+γs+γt+εist, (2)
where Zist reects a vector of indicator variables for mother's race, educational attainment,
or predicted probability of low-income (as described below).
4. Data from the American Time Use Surveys
We use the 20032018 Bureau of Labor Statistics' American Time Use Survey Data
(ATUS). ATUS is the nation's rst federally administered, continuous survey on time use in
the United States. The goal of the survey is to measure how people divide their time among
life's activities (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).10 ATUS data are linked to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and contain rich demographic and geographic information.
We keep all women ages 1849 in the main sample, 58,090 observations. Of these women,
43,685 are mothers and 14,940 are unmarried mothers.
With the use of time diaries, ATUS asks respondents how they spent every minute of a 24
hour day, also recording who they spent their time with. We scale reported time-use so that
units can be interpreted as weekly hours. We divide time-use into three broad categories:
paid work activities (including work, commuting, job search, and job-related socializing),
home production, and leisure.11 All time unaccounted for by these categories can be classied
as schooling, sleep, and uncategorized.12 We also determine whether time in each activity
was spent with children, creating our measure of time with children. Additionally, we create
a measure of investment time, a subset of leisure and home production activities in which
the mother was with her child. Investment time includes activities like doing homework
10Time-use data exists for earlier years, but these samples are relatively small (generally 2,0004,000
observations per year, compared to 10,00020,000 per year for 20032018) and contain fewer covariates.
11Home production includes cooking and meal preparation, housework, car maintenance, taking care of
garden or pets, travel related to household activities, other household management, taking care of children
or other household members, and shopping. Leisure time includes exercise and sports, games, watching TV
or movies, computer activity, socializing, talking on the phone or communicating, reading, listening to music
or the radio, arts and entertainment, hobbies educational activities, and own medical care.
12The mean value of uncategorized time is only 1.36 hours, out of 168 weekly hours.
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and children's education, providing and obtaining medical care, playing games or sports,
doing crafts, or attending museums or events together. See the Data Appendix for complete
details.
To measure labor supply, we have a few options available, some based on ATUS time-
diary data and others based on linked CPS data. Our preferred measures are labor force
participation (LFP, an indicator equal to one if employed or unemployed) and hours worked
last week, both from CPS survey data. We use these CPS-based measures unless otherwise
specied; however, results are qualitatively similar across measures.13
For time-use activities not specically related to time with children (e.g. working, home
production, leisure), we often study the full sample of women, since the largest incentive
dierences from EITC changes are between women with and without children. Between
these two groups, the EITC's eect on labor supply and time-use will be most detectable.
For outcomes related to spending time with children, we focus exclusively on mothers with
children in the household.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all women, all mothers, and unmarried women ages
1849 (using ATUS weights). On average, women have 1.2 children, are 33.8 years old, 52
percent are married, 89 and 33 percent nished high school and college, 13 and 17 percent are
Black or Hispanic, and have $26,000 and $66,000 in individual and total household earnings.
Average MaxEITC is $3,337, while the average EITC benets women are actually eligible
for is $668, with 24 percent receiving some benets.14 Compared to the sample of all women,
mothers are on average older, are more likely to be married, have lower education, are more
likely to be nonwhite, are less likely to be employed, and have lower individual earnings
but similar levels of household earnings. Compared to all mothers, unmarried mothers are
on average more socially and economically disadvantaged: younger with lower education,
more likely to be nonwhite, eligible for more EITC benets ($1,525 vs. $1,079), and more
likely to be eligible for at least some benets (51 vs. 35 percent). We also report summary
13As already discussed, ATUS also asks about time spent on work activities, but this measure is noisier,
since it is based on a 24 hour period, which may occur on a weekend day. Other available measures of labor
supply in the CPS include employed and usual weekly work hours.
14EITC benets imputed from NBER's TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). Details here: https:
//www.nber.org/taxsim/.
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statistics for the state-year variables we control for in our analysis (discussed in section 5.1):
state GDP growth rate, state per capita GDP, state unemployment rate, minimum wage,
maximum welfare benets for a family with 1, 2, 3, or 4 children.
Table 2 uses the sample of mothers and reports summary statistics for time-use variables.
Among all mothers, average weekly hours (from CPS) are 21.6 for work, 46.5 for home
production, 33.4 for leisure, 38.7 for time with children, and 6.0 for investment into children.
Table 2 also shows that mothers with more children spend less time on work and leisure,
while they spend more time on home production, with children, and investing in children.15
Figure 5 shows how weekly hours spent working, with children, and investing in children
vary with children's ages. On average, mothers with infants work 15 hours per week, and
work hours steadily increase with a child's age, reaching 20 hours by age 6 and 25 hours by
age 17. By contrast, maternal time with children monotonically decreases with a child's age:
mothers spend about 60 hours per week with infants, falling to 40 hours by age 8 and 20
hours at age 17. We also observe a steady decline in investment time as children age, falling
from about 10 hours per week for infants to 8 hours per week at age 4, to 2 hours per week
at age 17. Figure 5 also displays the 25th and 75th percentiles for hours with children and
investing in children by age of child.
5. Results
In this section, we rst establish the exogeneity of state EITC changes. We then examine
eects of the EITC on maternal labor supply before turning to impacts on other uses of
time, including home production, leisure, and time with children. We decompose time with
children into investment and non-investment activities to better understand how changes
in the EITC might impact child development via time-use decisions. We also study whether
time-use eects of the EITC dier on weekdays vs. weekends, and whether there are dier-
ential eects based on age of the mother or on the ages of children in the household. Finally,
we explore the robustness of our estimates to dierent sets of controls and specications that
15In the Online Appendix, we also show the full distribution for each category of time use by number
of children. Appendix Figures A.2, A.3, and A.4 show the distribution of hours worked last week (CPS
measure), home production, and leisure. Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6 show the distribution of total hours
with children and investment hours in children.
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leverage variation from state vs. federal EITC expansions.
5.1. Exogeneity of State EITCs
To examine whether EITC policy expansions are correlated with other state policies or
economic conditions, we regress measures of state EITCs on several state-year characteristics,
including GDP, unemployment rate, the top marginal income tax rate, the minimum wage,
welfare generosity for families with 1, 2, or 3 or more children, and sales tax rates. We also
include lags of each of these variables along with state and year FE.
In Table 3, we nd that across four specications and dozens of variables, only two
estimates are signicant at the 10 percent level. The four specications are combinations of
using the sample of all states or states that ever had a state EITC, and of using maximum
state EITC benets or the state EITC rate as outcomes. Testing for the joint signicance
of these state-level traits yields p-values between 0.85 and 0.95.16 Although we nd little
evidence that these traits are associated with state EITCs, we control for these state-level
traits throughout our analysis.
5.2. Labor Supply
We begin our analysis of time allocation decisions by studying the impact of the EITC
on labor supply, earnings, and family resources.
Among all women, Table 4 Panel A shows that a $1,000 increase in MaxEITC increases
average labor force participation (1.7 percentage points), weekly work hours (0.74), earnings
($1,166), and EITC benets ($245). Here, work hours refers to hours worked last week, as
reported in CPS data. By marital status, Table 4 Panel B shows larger estimated eects
among unmarried women on LFP (3 percentage points), weekly work hours (1.2), earnings
($1,597), EITC benets ($301), and the probability of being eligible for any EITC benets
(1.9 percentage points). Among married women, we nd insignicant eects, except on
EITC benets ($188).17 These dierences by marital status are all statistically signicant
16Contrary to these results, there is some evidence that state economic conditions or policies were associ-
ated with state EITC expansions in the 1990s (e.g., Hoynes and Patel (2018)).
17Increases in EITC benets are due to a mechanical and behavioral component. Even with no change in
labor supply, increases in MaxEITC will lead to increased EITC benets by those already receiving it.
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(p-values < 0.001) and are largely consistent with previous evidence on how the EITC aects
unmarried and married mothers (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006; Bastian and Jones, 2019).18
Restricting the sample to mothers, estimates in Table 4 Panel C are very similar to
(though less precise than) estimates in Panel B based on all women. For unmarried moth-
ers, each $1,000 increase in MaxEITC raises LFP (2.4 percentage points), hours worked
last week (0.83), earnings ($1,222), and EITC benets ($361). For married mothers, re-
sults are all insignicant, except for EITC benets ($238). Appendix Table A.1, presents
a similar pattern of results for subgroups of mothers by marital status interacted with race
or educational attainment (based on estimating equation (2)). Impacts are generally larger
and often signicant for unmarried mothers, regardless of race and education, while impacts
are mostly small and statistically insignicant for all types of married mothers (except for
positive eects on EITC benets).
The labor supply results presented thus far are based on CPS data on LFP and hours
worked last week. Appendix Table A.2 shows that results are robust to studying other
measures of labor supply from the CPS (usual weekly work hours, employed, and non-
self-employed LFP) or from time diary data from ATUS (weekly work hours, working > 0
hours/week, working ≥ 20 hours/week, and working ≥ 40 hours/week).
In Appendix Table A.3 we isolate the eects of state EITC expansions by limiting the
sample to years before or after the 2009 federal EITC expansion. In these specications,
variation in MaxEITC comes exclusively from state EITC expansions. We nd that both
before and after 2009, EITC expansions are associated with increases in LFP and weekly
hours worked among unmarried mothers, while eects for married mothers are much weaker
and mostly insignicant. These results also highlight that our estimates are not driven by
changes in labor supply associated with the Great Recession.
18Our study implictly addresses Kleven (2019) and his claim that the EITC does not impact labor supply
in two main ways: one, we focus on 20032018, well after welfare reform, ensuring that our EITC estimates
are not confounded with the simultaneity of 1990s EITC expansions and welfare reform; and two, by using
time-use outcomes, we provide an alternate approach to testing whether the EITC impacted mothers.
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5.3. Eects on Broad Categories of Time Allocation
Based on the labor supply results in Table 4, we expect to nd that the EITC led to
reductions in the amount of time unmarried mothers spend on non-work activities and that
the EITC had little eect on the time-use of married mothers. In Table 5, we divide each
woman's 168 weekly hours into home production, leisure, work activities, school, sleep, and
`uncategorized' using the ATUS time diary activity data.
For unmarried women, Panel A shows that $1,000 inMaxEITC reduces home production
and leisure (1.04 and 0.74 hours), increases work activities (1.50 hours), and has little eect
on school, sleep, and uncategorized time. For married mothers, whose labor supply is largely
unaected by the EITC, we see insignicant eects on other uses of time as well.
Panel B reveals similar patterns for the sample of mothers; however, estimated eects
on work activities are muted for unmarried mothers relative to all unmarried women. Con-
sequently, we also estimate more muted impacts on their other uses of time. Among single
mothers, a $1,000 increase in MaxEITC increases work activities by 0.63 hours per week
and reduces home production by 0.91 hours per week and leisure by 0.40 hours per week.
For married mothers, all impacts are statistically and economically insignicant.
5.4. Time With Children and Parental Time Investment in Children
We now look specically at how mothers spend their time with children. Table 5 Panel
B decomposes home production and leisure into time with and without children.19 Among
unmarried mothers, each $1,000 in MaxEITC reduces home production and leisure time
with children (-1.17 and -0.53 hours per week) but has small and insignicant eects on
home production and leisure time without children (0.26 and 0.12 hours per week).
Tables A.6 and A.7 decompose the reduction in home production and leisure time with
children (for unmarried mothers) into eight subcategories. Table A.6 shows that $1,000 in
MaxEITC leads to statistically signicant reductions in personal care (0.11 hours), house-
work (0.23 hours), and traveling/errands (0.19 hours). Reductions in waiting and shopping
19Time with children is not a mutually exclusive category, but rather overlaps with the other categories
shown in Table 5. We do not decompose work, school, sleep, or uncategorized time into with/without
children, because time with children is negligible for these activities and pre-2010 ATUS did not collect with
who information when respondents reported sleeping, grooming, personal/private activities, or working.
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(0.19 hours) are also substantial, though statistically insignicant. (We estimate negligible
eects on all remaining home production subcategories.) Table A.7 shows that the entire
reduction in leisure time with children comes from time spent socializing and relaxing.
Since the EITC reduces time that mothers spend with their children, it is natural to worry
about impacts for parental time investments (e.g. reading together, help with homework,
playing, doctor visits) and child development. Of course, reductions in time mothers spend
with children may not have much of an eect on child development if this time would have
been spent watching television, cleaning the house, etc. To investigate this issue, Table 6
decomposes maternal time spent with children into investment and non-investment activities.
Each $1,000 in MaxEITC reduces total time unmarried mothers spend with children by
1.61 hours per week, but this decrease is explained completely by non-investment time, which
declines by 1.56 hours per week. This reduction in non-investment time with children comes
more out of home production time (0.9 hours per week) than leisure (0.75 hours per week),
but reductions in both are signicant.
Although changes in total time spent on investment are negligible, this does not necessar-
ily mean that mothers do not adjust their time across dierent types of investment activities.
Given the changes in family income induced by EITC expansions, parents may adjust the
types of investment activities they engage in depending on the income elasticities of the
activities. These elasticities may dier, for example, due to dierent complementarities with
purchased goods and services or due to heterogeneous parental preferences for dierent types
of activities (e.g. parents may enjoy some activities more than others).
We consider the impacts of EITC expansions on the investment subcategories of aca-
demic, health, and other investment time. Table 6 shows very small and insignicant
eects of MaxEITC on academic investment time, modest but statistically signicant re-
ductions in health investment time, and osetting (but mostly insignicant) increases in
other investment time. Appendix Table A.8 shows that the reductions in health invest-
ment reect less time spent providing and obtaining medical care for children. This may
reect improvements in health that have previously been attributed to the EITC (Hoynes
et al., 2015; Averett and Wang, 2018; Braga et al., 2019) such that children require less
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medical attention.20 Appendix Table A.8 also shows that increases in other investment
time are entirely explained by increases in time spent playing (0.24 and 0.16 hours per week
for unmarried and married mothers, respectively). The sizeable impacts on play time for
married mothers suggests that these responses may be due to the increased family income
associated with EITC expansions. This might be expected if parents view time spent playing
with children as a luxury.21
5.5. EITC Eects on the Distribution of Time Use
We now briey consider the impacts of EITC expansions on the distributions of weekly
hours of work, home production, leisure, time with children, and time investing in children.
Specically, we estimate the eects of the EITC on the probability that unmarried mothers
spend more than x hours per week on an activity using the following specication:
1(Yist > x) = δ1MaxEITCist ·Marist+δ2MaxEITCist ·Unmarist+X ′istδ3+γs+γt+εist. (3)
In Figure 6, we restrict the sample to mothers. Panels AD show that an increase in
MaxEITC raises the probability of working up tobut not above40 hours per week.
Thus, the EITC draws women into the labor market but does not increase work beyond full-
time. An increase in MaxEITC signicantly reduces home production time in the 5090
hours per week range, while it only reduces leisure time at the low end of the distribution
(1020 hours per week). The EITC reduces time spent with children throughout much of
the distribution; however, investment time decreases most for the 130 hours range, while
eects are negligible for mothers who spend more than 40 hours per week on investment.22
5.6. Weekends vs. Weekdays
Because the EITC increases work among unmarried mothers, these mothers must reallo-
cate the rest of their time accordingly. Since most jobs are Monday to Friday, we may expect
20For example, increases in family income or employment may lead to improvements in health insurance.
21Indeed, Krueger et al. (2009) nd that parents enjoy time spent playing with their children relative to
nearly any other activity they study. The larger increase in time spent playing for married mothers is also
consistent with modest negative impacts of the EITC on their labor supply. While we do not nd a negative
eect on the average labor supply of married mothers, we do nd a decrease among younger married mothers
in Section 5.7, lining up with previous studies (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2019).
22Appendix Figure A.7 shows very similar eects on the distribution of hours of work, home production,
and leisure for the sample of all women.
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a larger impact on weekday relative to weekend time use. We do not rescale time use here,
so eects should still be interpreted as weekly hours.23 In Table 7, we explore the EITC's
impacts on weekend and weekday time spent on work, home production, and leisure, as well
as time spent with children. Panel A pools women interviewed on weekends and weekdays
(results shown in previous tables), while Panels B and C restrict the sample to women who
were interviewed on weekdays or weekends.
For unmarried mothers, columns 1 and 2 show that $1,000 inMaxEITC increases week-
day work activities by 2.1 hours each week, while it reduces home production and leisure
(combined) by 2.5 hours over the work week. Estimated eects are more muted and less
precise when the sample is restricted to mothers (columns 3 and 4). Columns 57 show
that unmarried mothers spend 2.5 fewer hours with children during weekdays, almost exclu-
sively made up of non-investment time. Eects on the weekend are generally much smaller
and statistically insignicant; although, in most cases, they suggest responses that partially
compensate for adjustments made during the work week.
5.7. Heterogeneous Eects by Mother's Age
We next explore whether there are important dierences in the way younger vs. older
mothers respond to changes in the EITC, since they have dierential labor market experience,
attachment, and opportunity costs.
In Figure 7, we allow the eects of the EITC to vary by age for unmarried and mar-
ried mothers by replacing MaxEITC ·Mar and MaxEITC · Unmar in equation (1) with∑
aMaxEITC ·Mar · 1(Age ∈ a) and
∑
aMaxEITC · Unmar · 1(Age ∈ a), where a rep-
resents six age categories: 1825, 2630, 3135, 3640, 4145, and 4650. The outcomes in
Panels A, B, and C are LFP, time with kids, and investment into kids.
Among unmarried mothers, the EITC has a larger eect on both LFP and time with
children for younger mothers. Each $1,000 increase in MaxEITC increases LFP by 2.4
percentage points for younger mothers and 1.8 percentage points for older mothers (results
are not signicantly dierent). Consistent with these adjustments in work behavior, among
23Recall that ATUS asks respondents how they spent every minute of a 24 hour day and that we re-scale
time-use so that units can be interpreted as weekly hours.
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younger mothers we observe reductions of over 2 hours per week spent with children and
insignicant eects on child investment. Among older mothers, eects on time with children
are smaller and close to zero for mothers over age 40. While statistically insignicant, we
nd a small increase in investment among older mothers, consistent with positive income
eects and no osetting reduction in their non-work time budget.
The eects for married mothers reveals an interesting pattern: for young married mothers
under age 25, the EITC has a negative eect on LFP and a positive eect on time with
and investment intochildren; while the EITC has a marginally signicant eect on those
aged 26-30 and null eects on those over age 30. The eects on younger married mothers
are consistent with previous research nding small negative eects on the labor supply of
married mothers (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2019).
5.8. Heterogeneous Eects by Child's Age
Since mothers typically spend progressively more time working and less time with children
as their children grow older (see Figure 5), we next explore whether responses to EITC
expansions depend on children's ages. To do so, we consider the eects of total time spent
with children in age group a (i.e., ages 0-2, 3-5,..., 18-20, 21-22), Y aist, by estimating separate
regressions for dierent age groups as follows:
Y aist = φ
a
1MaxEITCist ·Marist + φa2MaxEITCist · Unmarist +X ′istφa3 + γas + γat + εaist. (4)
Here, φa1 and φ
a
2 reect the impact of a $1,000 increase in the maximum EITC benet on
hours with (or investing in) children who are in age group a for married and unmarried
mothers, respectively. By denition, these eects reect impacts for mothers with at least
one child in age group a.24 Most children older than 18 are not EITC-eligible, unless they are
full-time students or disabled. However, we consider children up through age 22 as quasi-
placebo tests, since any eects for these (mostly ineligible) children would likely indicate
spurious eects of unmeasured factors.
Figure 8 reports the eects of MaxEITC on time spent with and investing in children
of each age. A $1,000 increase in the maximum EITC benet signicantly increases mar-
24Each regression uses the full sample of mothers with Y aist = 0 for mothers with no children in age group
a. Xist contains the full set of controls.
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ried mother's time spent with and investing in children ages 311: time spent with these
young children increases by 0.61.3 hours per week (Panel A), while time spent investing
increases by about one-third of an hour (Panel B). The same increase in MaxEITC signi-
cantly reduces the time unmarried mothers spend with children ages 614 by about an hour
(Panel A); however, it has no signicant eects on their investment time with children of
any age (Panel B). Finally, we note that eects on time spent with (or investing in) children
ages 2122 are both negligible and insignicant, consistent with their ineligibility for EITC
(in most cases).
5.9. Robustness
In this section, we examine whether our results are robust to alternate sets of controls,
alternate measures of the EITC, and whether mothers with the highest predicted probability
of having low income are most aected by EITC policy changes.25
Alternate Controls: In Tables 8 and 9, we test whether our main results are robust
to various sets of controls. Columns 13 progressively add year, state, and number of kids
FE; demographic traits; whether the time-use data was collected on a weekend or weekday;
and measured state-year factors (e.g. unemployment rate, minimum wage). Column 3 is
the full set of controls used for all results above. Columns 46 examine whether the results
are robust to progressively adding controls for state-specic time trends, state-specic time
trends interacted with an indicator for unmarried, and state-year factors interacted with
indicators for unmarried and having any children. These controls account for general trends
in unobserved state-specic factors by marital status and allow for measured state policies
and economic conditions to dierentially aect time allocation decisions by marital status
and children in the household. Finally, column 7 adds state × year FE, which largely
absorbs variation in state EITC expansions and identies the impact of the 2009 federal
EITC expansion, while column 8 adds year × number of children FE, largely absorbing
variation in the federal expansion (and other nationwide trends that dierentially aect
families of dierent sizes), identifying the impact of state EITC expansions.
Table 8 uses the sample of all women and examines the following outcomes: LFP, weekly
25When we separately estimate eects of the EITC by month, we nd similar results across months.
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work hours, and home production plus leisure hours. Across controls, the estimated eect
on LFP for unmarried women ranges from 3.0 to 3.9 percentage points; estimated eect on
weekly work hours ranges from 0.9 to 1.6; and the eect on home production and leisure
ranges from -1.6 to -2.2 hours. Among married mothers, all specications show consistent
evidence that the EITC has little impact on labor supply, while there is a modest reduction
in home production and leisure time.
Table 9 uses the sample of mothers and examines the same three outcomes from Ta-
ble 8, as well as time with children and time investing in children. Results for the rst
three outcomes are similar to but more muted and less precise than those in Table 8. For
unmarried mothers, the estimated eects on time with children range from -1.2 to -2.2 hours
per week across all specications, while estimated eects on time investing in children are
consistently very small and statistically insignicant. Among married mothers, all estimates
are insignicant.
Comparing columns 7 and 8 in both Tables 8 and 9 suggests that the 2009 federal EITC
expansion had larger eects on labor supply, home production and leisure, and time with
children than did state EITC expansions (for unmarried mothers).
Alternate Measures of the EITC: Table A.5 shows that results are robust to alternate
measures of EITC expansions, specically the EITC phase-in rate.26 We nd consistent
evidence that EITC expansions lead to increases in LFP and work hours, coupled with
reductions in home production and leisure time, for unmarried women and mothers. The
expansions also cause unmarried mothers to reduce their total time with children but have
little impact on their investment time with children. Among married women and mothers,
our estimates suggest no eect of changes in EITC phase-in rates on their time allocation.
Subgroups Based on Predicted Household Income: We have shown how the
EITC's impact varies by marital status, race, and education. In general, more economi-
cally disadvantaged mothers (e.g. unmarried, nonwhite, less educated) are more responsive
to changes in the EITC. To better examine the role of economic disadvantage, we now take
26Notice that if the federal phase in rate is 40 percent and the state EITC matches 20 percent of the
federal EITC, then the total phase-in rate is 0.40(1+0.20)=0.48. MaxEITC and phase-in rate are highly
correlated, see footnote 8.
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into account several (exogenous) demographic factors to predict which mothers are most
likely to have low household income (i.e. income less than $20,000 in 2017 dollars).27 These
women are most likely to nd themselves on the phase-in or plateau regions of the EITC
schedule, encouraging their labor supply. Dividing mothers into terciles based on their pre-
dicted probability of low income, we estimate equation (2) using these predicted probability
terciles as Zist variables interacted with MaxEITC and marital status. (Results are simi-
lar if we estimate a specication that only interacts the predicted probability terciles with
MaxEITC, estimating an average eect across married and unmarried mothers.)28
Table 10 shows consistent evidence that mothers that with the highest predicted probabil-
ity of having low household income are most aected by changes in the EITC. For unmarried
mothers, we estimate positive eects on LFP and negative eects on time with children and
time spent in home production or leisure for each tercile, with consistently larger eects for
mothers that are more likely to be economically disadvantaged. Among unmarried mothers
that are most likely to have low household income, each $1,000 increase in maximum EITC
benets raises LFP by 3 percentage points, while it lowers home production and leisure
combined by 2.0 hours per week and reduces time with children by 2.1 hours per week.
Importantly, none of our subgroups of unmarried mothers respond by reducing investment
time with their children (results are negative, but small and insignicant).
Among married mothers, we nd little evidence of any eects, except for a modest increase
in investment time with children among those least likely to be of low income. Altogether,
these results suggest that marital status is important even when conditioning on predicted
household income.
27Specically, we use OLS to estimate the probability that mothers have household income less than
$20,000 (in 2017 dollars) controlling for number of children FE, four categories of mother's educational
attainment (<12, =12, 1315, and >16), race, age, and birth year, as well as year and state FE. While we
do not use marital status to predict low income, it is strongly correlated with other traits associated with
economic disadvantage. As such, we nd that 44% of unmarried mothers vs. 25% of married mothers are in
the high-predicted-probability tercile.
28Women with the lowest predicted probability of low household income have less than a 0.12 probability,
while those in the highest tercile have a probability greater than 0.24. We note that results are similar when
using alternate sets of controls and other low-income cutos, or when using probit or logit estimators to
estimate the predicted probability of low income.
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6. Conclusions
Using data from the 20032018 ATUS, we study the eect of the 2009 federal EITC
expansion and several state EITC expansions on maternal time allocation decisions. Our
results provide strong evidence that recent expansions in the EITC increase maternal work
time, while reducing time allocated to home production and leisure activities. These impacts
are concentrated among unmarried and otherwise economically disadvantaged women, with
our results on labor supply largely conrming the prior literature that considered earlier
expansions of the EITC.
Our more novel contribution lies in our analysis of maternal time allocation at home, in
particular time spent with children. We nd robust evidence that unmarried mothers respond
to increases in the EITC by scaling back time with their children, especially primary-school
aged children. In particular, they spend less time engaging in activities like personal care,
housework, and relaxing when with their children. Importantly, they do not devote less time
to active learning and development activities like reading or helping with homework, and they
spend more time playing with their children. Among all the investment-related activities
we examine, only time spent providing and obtaining medical care declines in response to
EITC expansions. We suspect that this reects diminished need for medical services due
to health benets associated with higher incomes and/or greater health care access (Hoynes
et al., 2015; Braga et al., 2019; Averett and Wang, 2018).
Since labor supply among all but young (ages 1825) married mothers is not impacted by
the EITC expansions we study, it is no surprise that their time devoted to other activities also
remains largely unaected. That said, we observe modest increases in time spent with young
children. Modest (though statistically insignicant) increases in their time spent playing with
children are largely oset by reductions in time devoted to medical care, further suggesting
that these same eects for unmarried mothers may be driven by improvements in family
nances. If true, policies or economic changes that directly impact family resources may
lead to important reallocations of parental time within the household even if they do not
aect the amount of time parents spend outside of the home.
Altogether, our results suggest that while expansions of the EITC draw single mothers
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into the labor market and away from their children, the adverse developmental consequences
of this are likely to be quite limited, since reductions in time spent with children do not
appear to be very investment-oriented. Indeed, as several studies document (Dahl and
Lochner, 2012, 2017; Chetty et al., 2011; Bastian and Michelmore, 2018; Manoli and Turner,
2018; Agostinelli and Sorrenti, 2018), the benets for children from greater nancial resources
appear to dominate any potential adverse impacts of reductions in non-investment time.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample: All All Unmarried
Women Mothers Mothers
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Children 1.20 1.25 1.96 1.03 1.85 1.08
Age 33.78 9.26 34.39 8.52 30.23 9.29
Birth Year 1976.5 10.5 1975.9 9.7 1980.3 10.4
Married 0.52 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.00 0.00
HS Graduate 0.89 0.32 0.86 0.35 0.80 0.40
Some College 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.47 0.50
College Graduate 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.13 0.33
Black 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.25 0.43
Hispanic 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42
Employed 0.71 0.45 0.66 0.47 0.67 0.47
Individual Earnings (2018 $) 25,783 30,627 23,286 30,168 18,538 23,147
Household Earnings (2018 $) 65,848 48,216 65,920 48,463 46,315 41,475
Maximum Possible EITC 3,337 2,468 5,106 1,364 4,861 1,377
EITC Benet Eligibility 668 1,521 1,079 1,827 1,525 1,959
EITC Eligible 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.51 0.50
State GDP Growth Rate 4.03 2.82 4.05 2.87 4.01 2.78
State GDP (billions of 2018 $) 13.18 0.96 13.19 0.96 13.20 0.95
State Unemployment Rate 6.21 2.10 6.22 2.09 6.28 2.11
State Minimum Wage (2018 $) 8.05 1.12 8.04 1.11 8.05 1.11
Max TANF 1 Kid 409.8 166.1 408.9 167.4 401.6 166.9
Max TANF 2 Kids 506.1 206.4 504.6 207.8 496.7 208.0
Max TANF 3 Kids 597.3 243.8 595.3 245.3 586.5 246.9
Observations 58,090 43,685 14,940
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. EITC
data from NBER and IRS. EITC benets calculated using TAXSIM. Unemployment
rates from BLS. GDP from BEA regional data. Minimum wage from the Tax Pol-
icy Center's Tax Facts. Welfare benets from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules
Database.
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Table 2: Weekly Hours Spent on Dierent Activities, by Number of Children
All Mothers Mothers Mothers
Mothers with 1 with 2 with 3+
Child Children Children
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Activity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Work (CPS) 21.6 19.5 23.9 19.5 21.8 19.4 16.9 18.8
Home Production 46.5 23.7 41.3 22.2 48.2 23.3 53.3 25.0
with Children 22.0 21.0 15.4 17.9 24.6 20.6 30.4 23.1
Not with Children 24.4 18.1 26.0 18.8 23.6 17.3 22.9 17.6
Leisure 33.4 22.1 34.7 22.8 32.7 21.5 32.1 21.5
with Children 15.6 18.4 13.2 18.0 16.7 18.3 18.3 18.7
Not with Children 17.8 19.5 21.6 21.4 16.0 17.7 13.8 17.0
Total Hours with Children 38.7 31.7 29.3 30.0 42.5 30.5 50.2 31.7
Investment into Children 6.0 10.1 4.3 9.0 6.9 10.5 7.9 11.1
Observations 43,685 17,012 17,144 9,529
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. All measures
based on ATUS time-diary data except work hours, which are based on hours worked last
week in CPS.
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Table 3: Testing the Exogeneity of State EITCs
Sample: All States Ever Had a State EITC
Outcome: Max State State EITC Max State State EITC
EITC Benets Rate EITC Benets Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State Min Wage (2017 $) -0.0043 -0.00020 0.0028 0.00098
(0.015) (0.0023) (0.022) (0.0037)
Lag State Min Wage 0.0070 0.0025 0.0077 0.0024
(0.018) (0.0028) (0.024) (0.0039)
State Unemp Rate 0.00057 -0.00032 0.0073 0.00092
(0.019) (0.0031) (0.034) (0.0055)
Lag State Unemp Rate -0.0076 -0.00051 -0.0049 0.000094
(0.022) (0.0035) (0.038) (0.0063)
State GDP Growth Rate -0.0031 -0.00071 -0.022 -0.0037
(0.0054) (0.00089) (0.016) (0.0027)
Lag State GDP Growth Rate -0.00028 -0.00017 -0.0026 -0.00065
(0.0027) (0.00044) (0.0060) (0.0010)
Log State GDP 0.23 0.023 2.25 0.32
(0.41) (0.066) (1.62) (0.27)
Lag Log State GDP -0.41 -0.045 -2.41 -0.34
(0.47) (0.075) (1.79) (0.30)
Max TANF with 1 Child -0.0034 -0.00064 -0.0065 -0.0012
(0.0022) (0.00037) (0.0044) (0.00076)
Lag Max TANF with 1 Child -0.0018 -0.00023 -0.00078 -0.00000075
(0.0017) (0.00027) (0.0020) (0.00034)
Max TANF with 2 Children 0.0037 0.00064 0.0061 0.0011
(0.0025) (0.00038) (0.0042) (0.00071)
Lag Max TANF with 2 Children 0.0030 0.00046 0.0030 0.00041
(0.0020) (0.00030) (0.0019) (0.00031)
Max TANF with 3 Children -0.00081 -0.00013 -0.00067 -0.000071
(0.00090) (0.00013) (0.0013) (0.00022)
Lag Max TANF with 3 Children -0.0012 -0.00019 -0.0018 -0.00029
(0.00096) (0.00014) (0.0012) (0.00018)
Testing Joint Signicance (p-val.) 0.947 0.897 0.935 0.852
R-squared 0.950 0.953 0.921 0.924
Observations 761 761 404 404
Mean Dep Var 0.44 0.073 0.82 0.14
State, Year FE X X X X
State Time Trends X X X X
Notes: EITC data from NBER and IRS. Unemployment rates from BLS. GDP from BEA regional data.
Minimum wage from the Tax Policy Center's Tax Facts. Welfare benets from the Urban Institute's
Welfare Rules Database. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Labor Supply, Earnings, and EITC Benets
Outcome: LFP Weekly EITC Any Earnings Earnings
Work Benets EITC and EITC
Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Average Eects (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC 0.017 0.74 244.7 0.0042 1166.4 1411.2
(0.0081) (0.35) (49.3) (0.010) (385.4) (379.6)
R-squared 0.099 0.158 0.330 0.320 0.238 0.229
Panel B: Eects by Marital Status (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC × 0.0050 0.27 188.2 -0.010 732.4 920.6
Married (0.0086) (0.35) (47.5) (0.011) (396.2) (384.2)
MaxEITC × 0.030 1.20 300.9 0.019 1597.3 1898.2
Unmarried (0.0073) (0.35) (44.0) (0.0088) (386.6) (379.0)
R-squared 0.104 0.161 0.337 0.326 0.239 0.230
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Eects by Marital Status (Sample of Mothers, N=43,685)
MaxEITC × -0.0060 -0.24 238.0 0.0052 423.4 661.4
Married (0.011) (0.44) (36.2) (0.0092) (538.7) (532.1)
MaxEITC × 0.024 0.83 360.6 0.020 1222.0 1582.6
Unmarried (0.0093) (0.37) (35.0) (0.0089) (511.0) (514.8)
R-squared 0.093 0.131 0.284 0.291 0.213 0.200
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean Dep Var (All Women) 0.78 23.2 668.0 0.24 25782.9 26450.8
Mean Dep Var (Mothers) 0.74 21.6 1021.9 0.34 23514.9 24536.9
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Full set of controls
from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. Outcomes are based on CPS data. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Table 5: The EITC and Decomposing All 168 Weekly Hours of Time Use
Outcome: Home Production Leisure Work School Sleep Uncat.
With Children? Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Eects by Marital Status (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC × -0.47 -0.45 0.77 0.084 -0.024 0.096
Married (0.49) (0.38) (0.46) (0.29) (0.28) (0.069)
MaxEITC × -1.04 -0.74 1.50 0.021 0.20 0.062
Unmarried (0.47) (0.42) (0.46) (0.27) (0.32) (0.081)
R-squared 0.158 0.105 0.173 0.118 0.094 0.011
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.006 0.104 0.134 0.464 0.115 0.941
Mean Dep. Var. 41.7 34.2 26.1 3.10 61.4 1.36
Panel B: Eects by Marital Status (Sample of Mothers, N=43,685)
MaxEITC × -0.33 -0.023 -0.31 -0.069 -0.15 0.084 0.055 0.10 0.23 0.010
Married (0.61) (0.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.37) (0.45) (0.72) (0.27) (0.36) (0.086)
MaxEITC × -0.91 -1.17 0.26 -0.40 -0.53 0.12 0.63 0.18 0.49 0.014
Unmarried (0.51) (0.34) (0.35) (0.56) (0.36) (0.54) (0.61) (0.29) (0.48) (0.11)
R-squared 0.117 0.222 0.077 0.111 0.144 0.141 0.157 0.133 0.112 0.024
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.132 0.007 0.862 0.045 0.470 0.081 0.937
Mean Dep Var 46.5 22.0 24.4 33.4 15.6 17.8 23.5 2.18 60.9 1.49
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. The six categories are mutually
exclusive and add to 168 weekly hours. Work, school, sleep, and uncategorized time are not
decomposed into with/without children, since most of this time is not with children and since
pre-2010 ATUS did not collect with who information when respondents reported sleeping,
grooming, personal/private activities, or working. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3
used in each regression.
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Table 6: Time With Children: Investment and Non-Investment Time (Sample of
Mothers)
Outcome: Total Non-Investment Time Investment Time
Time Total Home Leisure Total Academic Health Other
Prod
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Eects by Marital Status
MaxEITC × -0.027 -0.31 -0.022 -0.43 0.28 0.096 -0.12 0.31
Married (0.67) (0.50) (0.36) (0.26) (0.21) (0.091) (0.029) (0.24)
MaxEITC × -1.61 -1.56 -0.90 -0.75 -0.049 -0.081 -0.15 0.18
Unmarried (0.61) (0.47) (0.31) (0.27) (0.19) (0.073) (0.027) (0.22)
R-squared 0.259 0.231 0.208 0.119 0.105 0.068 0.014 0.087
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.002
Panel B: Eects by Marital Status and Race
MaxEITC × 0.0086 -0.30 -0.031 -0.42 0.31 0.088 -0.12 0.34
White × Married (0.67) (0.50) (0.36) (0.26) (0.21) (0.089) (0.029) (0.24)
MaxEITC × -0.34 -0.42 0.0082 -0.54 0.083 0.14 -0.14 0.087
Nonwhite × Mar (0.70) (0.55) (0.38) (0.27) (0.19) (0.098) (0.028) (0.23)
MaxEITC × -1.74 -1.70 -0.96 -0.83 -0.038 -0.10 -0.15 0.22
White × Unmar (0.64) (0.49) (0.33) (0.27) (0.20) (0.072) (0.027) (0.23)
MaxEITC × -1.38 -1.30 -0.79 -0.61 -0.080 -0.037 -0.16 0.12
Nonwhite × Unmar (0.60) (0.48) (0.29) (0.28) (0.18) (0.073) (0.029) (0.21)
R-squared 0.259 0.232 0.208 0.119 0.106 0.068 0.014 0.088
Panel C: Eects by Marital Status and Education
MaxEITC × Married 0.97 0.52 0.45 -0.20 0.45 0.13 -0.084 0.40
× >12 Yrs Educ (0.76) (0.62) (0.46) (0.30) (0.19) (0.088) (0.035) (0.20)
MaxEITC × Mar -1.28 -1.36 -0.61 -0.73 0.085 0.053 -0.18 0.21
× ≤12 Yrs Educ (1.00) (0.83) (0.55) (0.53) (0.33) (0.13) (0.054) (0.38)
MaxEITC × Unmar -0.99 -0.97 -0.60 -0.57 -0.022 -0.056 -0.11 0.14
× >12 Yrs Educ (0.78) (0.66) (0.41) (0.34) (0.17) (0.070) (0.035) (0.18)
MaxEITC × Unmar -2.54 -2.41 -1.35 -1.00 -0.13 -0.12 -0.21 0.19
× ≤12 Yrs Educ (0.90) (0.80) (0.57) (0.50) (0.30) (0.12) (0.054) (0.35)
R-squared 0.260 0.232 0.208 0.119 0.106 0.068 0.014 0.088
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 38.7 32.7 19.9 11.7 6.04 1.19 0.23 4.62
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 1849 year-old women with at least one child
under age 19. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Table 7: Time-Use Eects: Weekends vs Weekdays
Sample: All Women All Mothers
Outcome: Work Home Prod. Work Home Prod.With Children
+ Leisure + Leisure
Total Invest
Hours Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Full Sample, Includes Weekends and Weekdays
MaxEITC × 0.77 -0.92 0.055 -0.40 -0.027 0.28
Married (0.46) (0.53) (0.72) (0.80) (0.67) (0.21)
MaxEITC × 1.50 -1.78 0.63 -1.32 -1.61 -0.049
Unmarried (0.46) (0.51) (0.61) (0.71) (0.61) (0.19)
R-squared 0.184 0.159 0.157 0.122 0.259 0.105
Observations 58,090 58,090 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 26.1 76.0 23.5 79.9 38.7 6.04
Panel B: Restricting Sample to Weekdays (MondayFriday)
MaxEITC × 0.99 -1.32 -0.36 -0.27 -0.46 0.28
Married (0.73) (0.80) (1.07) (1.20) (0.77) (0.26)
MaxEITC × 2.11 -2.54 0.51 -1.59 -2.52 -0.18
Unmarried (0.70) (0.73) (0.89) (1.11) (0.76) (0.26)
R-squared 0.121 0.115 0.098 0.087 0.245 0.121
Observations 28,690 28,690 21,608 21,608 21,608 21,608
Mean Dep Var 32.8 70.7 29.6 75.5 35.2 5.91
Panel C: Restricting Sample to Weekends (SaturdaySunday)
MaxEITC × -0.15 0.47 0.55 0.021 1.10 0.32
Married (0.48) (0.60) (0.60) (0.70) (1.07) (0.29)
MaxEITC × -0.28 0.50 0.59 0.017 0.56 0.28
Unmarried (0.53) (0.62) (0.66) (0.63) (0.98) (0.23)
R-squared 0.023 0.068 0.021 0.066 0.240 0.089
Observations 29,400 29,400 22,077 22,077 22,077 22,077
Mean Dep Var 9.51 88.9 8.49 91.0 47.7 6.35
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Table 8: Estimates Robust to Various Sets of Controls, Sample of All Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Outcome = Labor Force Participation (Mean = 0.78)
MaxEITC × 0.0071 0.0047 0.0050 0.0060 0.0065 0.0080 0.013 0.0070
Married (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.013)
MaxEITC × 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.039 0.032
Unmarried (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.013)
R-squared 0.090 0.103 0.104 0.105 0.106 0.107 0.125 0.108
Panel B: Outcome = Weekly Work Hours (Mean = 23.2)
MaxEITC × 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.44 0.46 0.38 0.71 -0.012
Married (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.42) (0.38)
MaxEITC × 1.19 1.20 1.20 1.37 1.38 1.30 1.63 0.90
Unmarried (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.41) (0.38)
R-squared 0.149 0.160 0.161 0.162 0.163 0.164 0.181 0.165
Panel C: Outcome = Weekly Home Production + Leisure Hours (Mean = 75.9)
MaxEITC × -0.69 -0.79 -0.92 -1.08 -1.01 -1.10 -1.38 -0.80
Married (0.62) (0.62) (0.53) (0.52) (0.51) (0.54) (0.54) (0.62)
MaxEITC × -1.56 -1.64 -1.78 -1.94 -1.87 -1.96 -2.20 -1.67
Unmarried (0.60) (0.60) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) (0.55) (0.53) (0.63)
R-squared 0.149 0.159 0.159 0.161 0.162 0.163 0.182 0.164
Controls
Year FE, State FE,
#Kids FE X X X X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X X X X
(Ed FE, Mar) × (St FE, Yr FE) X X X X X X X
State-Year Factors X X X X X X
State Trend X X X X X
State Trend × Unmarried X X X X
State-Year Factors × (Kids, Unmarried) X X X
State FE × Year FE X
Year FE × #Kids FE X
Observations 58,090 58,090 58,090 58,090 58,090 58,090 58,090 58,090
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. LFP and weekly work hours
from CPS survey data, home production and leisure hours from time-use ATUS data. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Table 9: Estimates Robust to Various Sets of Controls, Sample of Mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Outcome = Labor Force Participation (Mean = 0.74)
MaxEITC × -0.0050 -0.0077 -0.0060 -0.0054 -0.0056 -0.0096 0.0094 -0.0039
Married (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
MaxEITC × 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.039 0.026
Unmarried (0.010) (0.0099) (0.0093) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
R-squared 0.079 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.098 0.121 0.100
Panel B: Outcome = Weekly Work Hours (Mean = 21.6)
MaxEITC × -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 0.0087 0.0016 -0.023 0.61 0.16
Married (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.58) (0.60)
MaxEITC × 0.74 0.82 0.83 1.07 1.08 1.06 1.67 1.24
Unmarried (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.53)
R-squared 0.116 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.134 0.135 0.157 0.137
Panel C: Outcome = Weekly Home Production + Leisure Hours (Mean = 79.9)
MaxEITC × -0.11 -0.20 -0.40 -0.62 -0.54 -0.27 -0.65 -0.36
Married (0.96) (0.93) (0.80) (0.80) (0.79) (0.74) (0.85) (0.81)
MaxEITC × -1.00 -1.12 -1.32 -1.52 -1.45 -1.18 -1.50 -1.29
Unmarried (0.87) (0.82) (0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (0.68) (0.76) (0.79)
R-squared 0.109 0.121 0.122 0.123 0.125 0.126 0.150 0.128
Panel D: Outcome = Weekly Hours With Children (Mean = 38.7)
MaxEITC × 0.068 0.12 -0.027 -0.016 -0.033 -0.16 -0.68 0.30
Married (0.73) (0.75) (0.67) (0.68) (0.67) (0.69) (0.91) (0.80)
MaxEITC × -1.53 -1.45 -1.61 -1.59 -1.61 -1.70 -2.21 -1.23
Unmarried (0.68) (0.68) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62) (0.64) (0.83) (0.77)
R-squared 0.248 0.259 0.259 0.261 0.262 0.262 0.278 0.264
Panel E: Outcome = Investment Hours With Children (Mean = 6.0)
MaxEITC × 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.46
Married (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.32)
MaxEITC × 0.0026 -0.031 -0.049 0.017 0.0065 -0.0071 -0.11 0.13
Unmarried (0.23) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.29)
R-squared 0.098 0.105 0.105 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.127 0.109
Controls in Columns 18 Are Identical to Those in Table 8
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. LFP and weekly
work hours from CPS survey data; home production and leisure hours, hours with children,
and investment with children from time-use ATUS data. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Table 10: EITC Eects by Predicted Probability of Low Income
Outcome: LFP Hours with Hours Hours Home
Children Investing Production
in Children and Leisure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MaxEITC × Low -0.0043 0.33 0.40 -0.28
× Married (0.010) (0.74) (0.24) (0.82)
MaxEITC × Med -0.0070 -0.30 0.25 -0.42
× Married (0.011) (0.70) (0.22) (0.87)
MaxEITC × High -0.0010 -0.82 0.069 -1.33
× Married (0.015) (0.78) (0.27) (0.99)
MaxEITC × Low 0.018 -1.44 -0.13 -1.00
× Unmarried (0.0076) (0.66) (0.18) (0.70)
MaxEITC × Med 0.021 -2.14 -0.21 -1.47
× Unmarried (0.0095) (0.67) (0.21) (0.74)
MaxEITC × High 0.030 -2.07 -0.10 -2.04
× Unmarried (0.013) (0.69) (0.24) (0.91)
R-squared 0.093 0.260 0.106 0.122
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old.
To create terciles (Low, Med, High) for predicted probability of low earnings,
we rst regress an indicator for household earnings less than $20,000 on a set of
controls (year FE, state FE, number of kids FE, 4 education categories, black,
hispanic, age, and birth year) using ATUS weights. Then, the predicted prob-
abilities are used to categorize individuals into terciles, where the cutos are
probabilities 0.12 and 0.24. Among married mothers, 40, 35, and 25 percent
are in terciles 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Among unmarried mothers, 25, 32, and
44 percent are in terciles 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The outcome regressions
control for predicted probability tercile FE and the full set of controls from Ta-
ble 8 column 4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the state level.
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Fig. 1. Federal EITC Structure, 2018
Source: Authors' calculations from IRS data.
Fig. 2. Maximum Possible Federal EITC Over Time
Source: Authors' calculations from IRS data.
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Fig. 3. State EITC Rates (as a Fraction of Federal Benets) Over Time
Notes: Authors' calculations from NBER data. https://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-eitc.html.
Although CA has a high match rate, it only matches up to half of the maximum federal EITC benet, so in
our regressions we divide the CA state EITC rate by two.
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Fig. 4. Distribution MaxEITC, by Number of Children and Pre/Post-2009
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old.
Fig. 5. Time Spent Working and Time with Children, by Age of Child
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old.
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Fig. 6. Eect of the EITC on Time-Use among Unmarried Mothers: Prob(Hours > X)
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. Each estimate comes from a
separate regression using equation (3). Work hours in Panel A come from CPS survey data; outcomes in
Panels BD come from ATUS data, which asks about time-use in a single day and we scale these to weekly
hours. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Fig. 7. EITC Eect on LFP and Time Spent with Children, by Mother's Age
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. Each estimate comes from a
single regression resembling equation (1), except MaxEITC × Unmarried and MaxEITC × Married are
interacted with six binary age categories of the mother. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in
each regression. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Fig. 8. Eects of the EITC on Time with Children, by Age of Children
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. Estimates from equation (4).
Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Table A.1: Labor Supply, Earnings, and EITC Benets: by Race and Education
Outcome: LFP Weekly EITC Any Earnings Earnings
Work Benets EITC and EITC
Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Eects by Marital Status and Race
MaxEITC × -0.0054 -0.26 233.1 0.0041 421.9 655.0
White × Married (0.011) (0.45) (36.1) (0.0096) (545.9) (537.7)
MaxEITC × -0.0081 -0.049 262.1 0.0099 539.1 801.2
Nonwhite × Married (0.0097) (0.42) (36.9) (0.0090) (533.4) (537.2)
MaxEITC × 0.028 0.99 338.3 0.014 1449.2 1787.4
White × Unmarried (0.0094) (0.37) (35.2) (0.0098) (509.1) (509.9)
MaxEITC × 0.016 0.54 401.8 0.031 822.7 1224.5
Nonwhite × Unmarried (0.010) (0.39) (37.1) (0.0090) (536.4) (543.3)
R-squared 0.094 0.132 0.285 0.292 0.213 0.201
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Eects by Marital Status and Education
MaxEITC × Married -0.0095 -0.59 89.7 -0.0049 951.7 1041.3
× >12 Yrs Educ (0.010) (0.37) (43.2) (0.0088) (780.5) (795.8)
MaxEITC × Married -0.00051 0.21 427.3 0.017 -255.2 172.1
× ≤12 Yrs Educ (0.021) (0.77) (64.4) (0.021) (546.6) (526.0)
MaxEITC × Unmarried 0.016 0.53 251.1 0.018 1634.6 1885.7
× >12 Yrs Educ (0.012) (0.37) (43.6) (0.0080) (785.0) (802.9)
MaxEITC × Unmarried 0.032 1.24 518.0 0.025 640.1 1158.0
× ≤12 Yrs Educ (0.018) (0.69) (62.1) (0.020) (472.0) (465.1)
R-squared 0.093 0.131 0.287 0.292 0.213 0.200
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 0.74 21.6 1021.9 0.34 23514.9 24536.9
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. Outcomes are
based on CPS data. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the
state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Table A.2: Robust to Various Measuring of Labor Supply
ATUS Time-Use Data CPS Data
Outcome: Time-Use >0 ≥ 20 ≥ 40 Usual Working LFP
Work Work Work Work Hours Non-
Hours Hours Hours Hours Self-Emp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Average Eects (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC 1.13 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.61 0.016 0.020
(0.45) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0077) (0.32) (0.0084) (0.0072)
R-squared 0.184 0.164 0.173 0.168 0.161 0.115 0.092
Panel B: Eects by Marital Status (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC × 0.77 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.094 0.0073 0.0077
Married (0.46) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.31) (0.0090) (0.0075)
MaxEITC × 1.50 0.021 0.025 0.027 1.13 0.024 0.033
Unmarried (0.46) (0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.31) (0.0080) (0.0064)
R-squared 0.184 0.165 0.174 0.169 0.164 0.117 0.096
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Eects by Marital Status and Race (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC × 0.71 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.059 0.0075 0.0072
White × Married (0.47) (0.0081) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.32) (0.0093) (0.0078)
MaxEITC × 1.14 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.33 0.0082 0.011
Nonwhite × Married (0.43) (0.0077) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.30) (0.0074) (0.0065)
MaxEITC × 1.66 0.023 0.027 0.030 1.21 0.028 0.034
White × Unmarried (0.47) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0076) (0.31) (0.0086) (0.0069)
MaxEITC × 1.19 0.016 0.020 0.021 0.97 0.015 0.030
Nonwhite × Unmarried (0.47) (0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.32) (0.0074) (0.0062)
R-squared 0.185 0.165 0.174 0.170 0.165 0.118 0.096
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel D: Eects by Marital Status (Sample of Mothers, N=43,685)
MaxEITC × 0.055 0.00024 0.0011 0.0017 -0.39 -0.0040 0.00010
Married (0.72) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.46) (0.013) (0.010)
MaxEITC × 0.63 0.0089 0.0098 0.013 0.81 0.015 0.030
Unmarried (0.61) (0.0095) (0.010) (0.0095) (0.37) (0.011) (0.0097)
R-squared 0.157 0.144 0.151 0.148 0.138 0.108 0.084
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.045 0.060 0.057 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean Dep Var (All Women) 26.15 0.493 0.438 0.376 23.22 0.714 0.735
Mean Dep Var (Mothers) 23.5 0.46 0.40 0.34 21.4 0.67 0.69
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. These outcomes are based on time-use variables.
Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Table A.3: State EITC Expansions and Labor Supply
Sample Years: 20032008 20092018
Outcome: LFP WeeklyWeekly LFP WeeklyWeekly
Work Work Work Work
Hours Hours Hours Hours
CPS CPS ATUS CPS CPS ATUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MaxEITC × 0.013 0.88 0.98 -0.0025 -0.16 0.46
Married (0.013) (0.50) (0.71) (0.015) (0.50) (0.71)
MaxEITC × 0.036 1.67 1.73 0.023 0.87 1.16
Unmarried (0.014) (0.54) (0.76) (0.014) (0.50) (0.74)
R-squared 0.105 0.153 0.199 0.116 0.178 0.188
Observations 26,544 26,544 26,544 31,546 31,546 31,546
Mean Dep Var 0.78 23.9 26.5 0.78 23.3 26.0
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state
level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Table A.4: The EITC and Decomposing All Time-Use (168 Weekly Hours)
Outcome: Home Production Leisure Work School Sleep Uncat.
With Children? Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Eects by Marital Status and Race
MaxEITC × -0.37 -0.036 -0.33 0.018 -0.11 0.13 0.030 0.11 0.20 0.011
White × Married (0.61) (0.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.37) (0.45) (0.73) (0.27) (0.36) (0.086)
MaxEITC × -0.16 0.033 -0.20 -0.66 -0.48 -0.18 0.34 0.087 0.40 0.0034
Nonwhite × Married (0.60) (0.41) (0.39) (0.51) (0.38) (0.46) (0.69) (0.27) (0.37) (0.087)
MaxEITC × -1.11 -1.25 0.14 -0.39 -0.58 0.19 0.87 0.17 0.45 0.011
White × Unmarried (0.51) (0.37) (0.34) (0.54) (0.37) (0.52) (0.62) (0.30) (0.49) (0.11)
MaxEITC × -0.55 -1.02 0.47 -0.47 -0.46 -0.011 0.23 0.20 0.57 0.017
Nonwhite × Unmarried (0.54) (0.31) (0.38) (0.60) (0.35) (0.59) (0.64) (0.30) (0.47) (0.11)
R-squared 0.117 0.222 0.077 0.113 0.144 0.141 0.158 0.133 0.113 0.024
Panel B: Eects by Marital Status and Education
MaxEITC × Married -0.26 0.49 -0.75 0.16 0.20 -0.046 -0.90 0.54 0.38 0.077
× >12 Yrs Educ (0.60) (0.55) (0.34) (0.50) (0.36) (0.47) (0.84) (0.23) (0.38) (0.096)
MaxEITC × Married -0.45 -0.67 0.22 -0.35 -0.59 0.24 1.35 -0.52 0.048 -0.074
× ≤12 Yrs Educ (1.00) (0.57) (0.60) (1.07) (0.71) (0.79) (1.32) (0.47) (0.48) (0.14)
MaxEITC × Unmarried -0.68 -0.83 0.15 -0.28 -0.36 0.085 -0.45 0.81 0.53 0.057
× >12 Yrs Educ (0.56) (0.51) (0.35) (0.59) (0.37) (0.55) (0.95) (0.28) (0.48) (0.10)
MaxEITC × Unmarried -1.16 -1.68 0.52 -0.61 -0.81 0.20 2.00 -0.58 0.40 -0.051
× ≤12 Yrs Educ (0.93) (0.56) (0.56) (1.06) (0.66) (0.87) (1.12) (0.47) (0.57) (0.17)
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var (Mothers) 46.5 22.0 24.4 33.4 15.6 17.8 23.5 2.18 60.9 1.49
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers 1849 years old. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. The six categories are mutually exclusive and sum to 168
weekly hours. Tables A.6 and A.7 further decompose home production and leisure with children from columns
2 and 5. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Table A.5: Outcomes Robust to EITC Denition
Outcome: LFP Work Home Prod. Time with Investing
Hours and Leisure Children in Children
Hours Hours Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sample = All Women
EITC Phase-In Rate 0.0020 0.064 -1.08
× Married (0.012) (0.47) (0.80)
EITC Phase-In Rate 0.037 1.41 -2.26
× Unmarried (0.010) (0.48) (0.77)
R-squared 0.103 0.160 0.159
Observations 58,090 58,090 58,090
Panel B: Sample = All Mothers
EITC Phase-In Rate -0.019 -0.81 -0.27 0.49 0.47
× Married (0.015) (0.60) (1.21) (0.89) (0.31)
EITC Phase-In Rate 0.033 1.18 -1.62 -2.92 -0.21
× Unmarried (0.012) (0.53) (1.10) (0.78) (0.28)
R-squared 0.093 0.131 0.122 0.260 0.105
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women or all mothers 1849 years old.
Units are 10 percentage points. The following example illustrates the phase-in rate: if the
federal phase-in rate is 40 percent and the state EITC matches 20 percent of the federal
EITC, then the total phase-in rate is 0.40(1+0.20)=0.48. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column
3 used in each regression.
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Table A.6: Decomposing Home Production with Kids (from Table 5 Column 2)
Outcome: Personal House- Food Waiting, Caring Civic Eating Errands,
Care work Prep Shop- for Travel
ping Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MaxEITC × -0.069 0.042 0.025 -0.087 0.024 -0.0074 0.11 -0.044
Married (0.035) (0.16) (0.041) (0.30) (0.046) (0.0066) (0.091) (0.061)
MaxEITC × -0.11 -0.23 0.029 -0.19 -0.0034 -0.0069 -0.015 -0.19
Unmarried (0.049) (0.15) (0.040) (0.29) (0.026) (0.0057) (0.088) (0.046)
R-squared 0.019 0.082 0.013 0.158 0.014 0.020 0.156 0.059
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.257 0.000 0.683 0.036 0.404 0.841 0.011 0.001
Full Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 0.24 3.48 0.11 6.48 0.12 0.013 4.09 2.85
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 1849 year-old mothers. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8
column 3 used in each regression.
Table A.7: Decomposing Leisure with Kids (from Table 5 Column 5)
Outcome: Activities Educ Socializing Sports ReligiousVolunteer Phone Travel
with & Relaxing
Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MaxEITC × 0.13 0.0037 -0.43 0.053 -0.013 0.0025 0.055 0.043
Married (0.17) (0.0081) (0.25) (0.052) (0.047) (0.042) (0.020) (0.035)
MaxEITC × 0.094 0.0030 -0.58 0.038 -0.051 -0.074 0.039 0.0035
Unmarried (0.17) (0.0085) (0.25) (0.051) (0.049) (0.055) (0.017) (0.036)
R-squared 0.087 0.011 0.097 0.024 0.055 0.016 0.022 0.050
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.456 0.756 0.202 0.468 0.028 0.001 0.053 0.004
Full Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 2.98 0.017 10.2 0.63 0.52 0.33 0.14 0.78
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 1849 year-old mothers. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in
each regression.
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Table A.8: Decomposing Health and Other Investment in Kids (Table 6 columns 7 and 8)
Health Investment Other Investment
Provide Obtain Arts Talk Organize Look Attend
Medical Medical Play and Sports and and After Events
Care Care Crafts Listen Plan Kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MaxEITC × -0.068 -0.055 0.16 0.0022 0.051 -0.040 0.0069 0.085 0.041
Married (0.023) (0.028) (0.15) (0.013) (0.052) (0.038) (0.012) (0.075) (0.062)
MaxEITC × -0.085 -0.068 0.24 0.0049 0.032 -0.064 -0.0016 0.026 -0.051
Unmarried (0.022) (0.026) (0.14) (0.013) (0.051) (0.038) (0.012) (0.083) (0.046)
R-squared 0.010 0.016 0.082 0.013 0.020 0.037 0.016 0.029 0.029
Eq. E. (p-val.) 0.013 0.253 0.067 0.678 0.326 0.044 0.049 0.005 0.000
Unmarried vs Mar -0.017 -0.012 0.076 0.0027 -0.019 -0.024 -0.0085 -0.059 -0.092
Dierence (0.0070) (0.011) (0.041) (0.0064) (0.019) (0.012) (0.0043) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 0.11 0.12 2.28 0.075 0.56 0.41 0.078 0.60 0.63
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 1849 year-old mothers. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each
regression.
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Fig. A.1. Maximum Possible Federal + State EITC Over Time
Source: Authors' calculations from IRS and NBER data. Each point denotes a state by year value.
Fig. A.2. CDF of Weekly Work Hours, by Number of Children
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Weekly work hours from CPS
hours worked last week.
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Fig. A.3. CDF of Home-Production Hours, by Number of Children
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Home production hours from
ATUS data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).
Fig. A.4. CDF of Weekly Leisure Hours, by Number of Children
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Leisure hours comes from ATUS
data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).
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Fig. A.5. CDF of Weekly Hours with Children, by Number of Children
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Time with kids comes from
ATUS data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).
Fig. A.6. CDF of Weekly Hours Invested in Children, by Number of Children
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Investment hours comes from
ATUS data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).
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Fig. A.7. EITC Eect on Time-Use by Unmarried Women: Prob(Hours > X)
Notes: 20032018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women 1849 years old. Figure identical to Figure 6
Panels A-D except the sample includes all women. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Data Appendix: ATUS Data Activity Lexicon (2003)
This appendix provides a detailed description of how we categorized all ATUS time-use
activities.
The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is a comprehensive survey of time use in the
U.S. and has been administered annually since 2003. The ATUS sample is drawn from the
Current Population Surveys (CPS), covering the population of non-institutionalized civilians
at least 15 years old. Typical sample sizes have been about 26,000 respondents since 2004
with surveys administered evenly throughout the year. We use sample weights designed to
adjust for stratied sampling, non-response, and to get a representative measure for each
day of the year.
The survey asks individuals detailed information about all of their activities over the
previous day, including who they were with at the time. The survey also collects information
about the respondent and household. It can be linked with the CPS data. Our analysis
combines data from the 20032018 surveys.
The following provides a detailed breakdown of how we categorized all ATUS time-use
activities based on the 2003 ATUS Data Activity Lexicon.
HOME PRODUCTION:
01 Personal Care
01.02 Grooming - all
01.03 Health-related Self Care - all
01.05 Personal Care Emergencies - all
01.99 Personal Care, n.e.c* - all
02 Household Activities
02.01 Housework - all
02.02 Food and Drink Preparation, Presentation, and Clean-up - all
02.03 Interior Maintenance, Repair, and Decoration - all
02.04 Exterior Maintenance, Repair, and Decoration - all
02.05 Lawn, Garden, and Houseplants - all
02.06 Animals and Pets - all
02.07 Vehicles - all
02.08 Appliances and Tools - all
02.09 Household Management - all
02.99 Household Activities, n.e.c* - all
03 Caring For and Helping Household Members
03.01 Caring For and Helping Household Children
03.01.01 Physical care for household children
03.01.06 Talking with/listening to household children
03.01.07 Helping/teaching household children (not related to education)
03.01.08 Organization and planning for household children
03.01.09 Looking after household children (as a primary activity)
03.01.10 Waiting for/with household children
03.01.11 Picking up/dropping o household children (as a primary activity)
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03.01.99 Caring for and helping household children, n.e.c.*
03.02 Activities Related to household Children's Education - all
03.03 Activities Related to household Children's Health - all
03.04 Caring for Household Adults - all
03.05 Helping Household Adults - all
03.99 Caring for and Helping Household Members, n.e.c.* - all
04 Caring For and Helping Nonhousehold Members
04.01 Caring For and Helping nonhousehold Children
04.01.01 Physical care for nonhousehold children
04.01.06 Talking with/listening to nonhousehold children
04.01.07 Helping/teaching nonhousehold children (not related to education)
04.01.08 Organization and planning for nonhousehold children
04.01.09 Looking after nonhousehold children (as primary activity)
04.01.11 Waiting for/with nonhousehold children
07 Consumer Purchases - all
08 Professional and Personal Care Services - all
09 Household Services - all
10 Government Services and Civic Obligations - all
11 Eating and Drinking - all
16 Telephone Calls
16.01 Telephone Calls (to or from)
16.01.03 Telephone calls to/from education services providers
16.01.04 Telephone calls to/from salespeople
16.01.05 Telephone calls to/from professional or pers. care svcs providers
16.01.06 Telephone calls to/from household services providers
16.01.07 Telephone calls to/from paid child or adult care providers
16.01.08 Telephone calls to/from government ocials
16.99 Telephone Calls, n.e.c* - all
17 Traveling
17.01 Travel Related to Personal Care - all
17.02 Travel Related to Household Activities - all
17.03 Travel Related to Caring For and Helping household Members - all
17.04 Travel Related to Caring For and Helping Nonhousehold Members - all
17.07 Travel Related to Consumer Purchases - all
17.08 Travel Related to Using Professional and Personal Care Services - all
17.09 Travel Related to Using Household Services - all
17.10 Travel Related to Using Government Services and Civic Obligations - all
17.11 Travel Related to Eating and Drinking - all
17.16 Travel Related to Telephone Calls - all
17.17 Security Procedures Related to Traveling - all





06.01.01 Taking class: degree
06.01.03 Waiting associated with taking classes
06.01.04 Security procedures related to taking classes
06.01.99 Taking class, n.e.c.*
06.03 Research/Homework
06.03.01 Research/homework: class for degree
06.03.03 Waiting associated with research/homework
06.03.99 Research/homework n.e.c*
06.04 Registration/Administrative Activities
06.04.01 Administrative activities: class for degree
06.04.03 Waiting associated with administrative activities (education)
06.04.99 Administrative for education, n.e.c*
06.99 Education, n.e.c* - all
17 Traveling
17.06 Travel Related to Education - all
WORK:
05 Working and Work-Related Activities - all
17 Traveling
17.05 Travel Related to Work - all
LEISURE:
01 Personal Care
01.04 Personal Activities - all
03 Caring For and Helping Household Members
03.01 Caring For and Helping Household Children
03.01.02 Reading to/with household children
03.01.03 Playing with household children, not sports
03.01.04 Arts and crafts with household children
03.01.05 Playing sports with household children
03.01.10 Attending household children's events
04 Caring For and Helping Nonhousehold Members
04.01 Caring For and Helping nonhousehold Children
04.01.02 Reading to/with nonhousehold children
04.01.03 Playing with nonhousehold children
04.01.04Arts and crafts with nonhousehold children
04.01.05 Playing sports with nonhousehold children
04.01.10 Attending nonhousehold children's events
04.01.12 Dropping o/picking up nonhousehold children
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04.01.99 Caring for nonhousehold children n.e.c.*
04.02 Activities Related to Nonhousehold Children's Education - all
04.03 Activities Related to Nonhousehold Children's Health - all
04.04 Caring For Nonhousehold Adults - all
04.05 Helping Nonhousehold Adults - all
04.99 Caring for and Helping Nonhousehold Members, n.e.c.* - all
06 Education
06.01 Taking Class
06.01.02 Taking class: personal interest
06.02 Extracurricular School Activities (Except Sports) - all
06.03 Research/Homework
06.03.02 Research/homework: class for personal interest
06.04 Registration/Administrative Activities
06.04.02 Administrative activities: class for personal interest
12 Socializing, Relaxing, and Leisure - all
13 Sports, Exercise, and Recreation - all
14 Religious and Spiritual Activities - all
15 Volunteer Activities - all
16 Telephone Calls
16.01 Telephone Calls (to or from)
16.01.01 Telephone calls to/from family members
16.01.21 Telephone calls to/from friends, neighbors, or acquaintances
17 Traveling
17.12 Travel Related to Socializing, Relaxing, and Leisure - all
17.13 Travel Related to Sports, Exercise, and Recreation - all
17.14 Travel Related to Religious/Spiritual Activities - all
17.15 Travel Related to Volunteer Activities - all
UNCATEGORIZED:
01 Personal Care
01.01 Sleeping - all
50 Data Codes - all
INVESTMENT TIME
Our measure of child time investment sums all of the time parents report spending with
children in each of the following activities (each categorized as either home production or
leisure as above):
(03.01) Caring For and Helping Household Children: (03.01.02) Reading to/with household
children; (03.01.03) Playing with household children, not sports; (03.01.04) Arts and crafts
with household children; (03.01.05) Playing sports with household children; (03.01.06) Talk-
ing with/listening to household children; (03.01.07) Helping/teaching household children
(not related to education); (03.01.08) Organization and planning for household children;
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(03.01.09) Looking after household children (as a primary activity; (03.01.10) Attending
household children's events.
(03.02) Activities Related to Household Children's Education: (03.02.01) Homework (house-
hold children); (03.02.02) Meetings and School Conferences (household children); (03.02.03)
Home schooling of household children.
(03.03) Activities Related to Household Children's Health: (03.03.01) Providing medical care
to household children; (03.03.02) Obtaining medical care for household children.
(12.03) Relaxing and Leisure: (12.03.07) Playing games; (12.03.09) Arts and crafts as a
hobby.
(12.04) Arts and Entertainment (other than sports): (12.04.01) Attending performing arts;
(12.04.02) Attending museum; (12.04.03) Attending movies/lm.
(13.01) Participating in Sports, Exercise, and Recreation: all subcategories.
17
